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     Preface 
     
     
      The Hale Ethics Series is a set of occasional 
publications on various aspects of ethics. Its scope is as broad as the 
scope of ethics, and that is broad indeed.
 Ethical issues permeate our lives. If I jump the line to buy tickets, 
I am making an ethical judgment that I deserve service before those 
already in line. Just consider how indignant we get when someone barges 
in front of us. In deciding to flip a coin to settle a dispute, I am making an 
ethical decision. I am deciding that what is in dispute does not by right 
belong to either party to the dispute or if it does, the resolution of the 
dispute is more important than any right either party has. Even the 
simplest and most mundane acts are suffused with ethical value. Life 
without ethical risk is impossible.
 So one aim is that the pieces in the Series allow us to see more 
clearly than we might otherwise how ethics affects us. Another is that the 
works will take us out of ourselves, as it were, to begin to see the ethical 
world as others may see it.
 Just as our particular way of walking seems so natural that it is 
difficult to imagine how we could move through the world with any other 
gait, so the moral judgments we make may seem so natural, so obvious to 
us, that we find it incomprehensible how anyone could think differently. 
The first step in moral maturity comes from realizing that what seems 
obvious to us may not be correct. The ways in which we are reared can 
blind us to ethical issues that we can come to understand only by seeing 
ourselves as others see us.
 The more ways we look at ethical issues, the more likely it is that 
we shall come to understand them. So the pieces to be published will 
cover a full range of topics from the history of ethics to knotty ethical 
problems to ethical theory—anything of philosophical substance that can 
raise our level of ethical understanding. Some of these pieces will be 
drawn from lectures sponsored by the Ezra A. Hale Chair in Applied 
Ethics as part of the Hale Ethics Series, but no matter what their 
provenance, the aim is to increase our knowledge of ethics and our 
understanding of the complexities of ethical issues. We will make no 
progress in understanding how ethical problems can arise and how we 
may resolve them ethically if we do not examine and discuss them, no 
matter how contentious they may be.
 The pieces published are chosen on their merit, their 
philosophical acumen and their clarity of style and argument, without 
regard to any other consideration. 
 The Ezra A. Hale Chair in Applied Ethics was funded through 
the generosity of Pat and Bill Hale, in honor of Ezra A. Hale of Rochester, 
New York. I thank them for their generosity and concern that the world 
become a better place.
 Wade L. Robison
 Ezra A. Hale Professor in Applied Ethics
 Department of Philosophy
 Rochester Institute of Technology
     Abstract 
     
     
      It seems a reasonable hypothesis that institutional 
health depends upon institutional integrity and institutional integrity 
depends upon individual integrity. If that’s right, “disease” may be 
manifest at two levels—at the level of institutional or individual integrity.  
 I begin with the first part of the hypothesis above, that 
institutional integrity is a condition of institutional health. The legal 
theorist Lon Fuller articulated this idea in a less generalized form when 
he spoke of a morality internal to law that makes law possible. I will 
explain and illustrate this idea and indicate how it applies to institutions 
of various sorts, includ-ing professions such as engineering, architecture, 
or medicine. Then I will turn to the second part of the hypothesis, that 
there is a dependency relation between institutional integrity and 
individual integrity. However, instead of exploring the conse-quences of 
lapses of integrity by individuals within an organization, I will approach 
this part of the hypothesis in terms of its suggestion that institutional 
integrity nourishes or promotes individual integrity. This suggestion 
presupposes a formative relation between institutions and persons; that in 
some meas-ure our practices dictate both what we should do and what 
we should be. Todd May makes a powerful case for this thesis in his book 
Our Practices, Ourselves, and a recent book on privacy by Anita Allen has 
a similar thrust. I draw on their work to cash out what is little more than a 
suggestion in Fuller’s legal philosophy. I do this with an eye to achieving 
some clarity about what’s at stake if, as was suggested earlier, “disease” 
can manifest itself at the level of institutional integrity as well as individual 
integrity. And that, in turn, adds to the strength of the case for saying, 
with Fuller, that the principles internal to an enterprise constitute a 
morality and the responsibilities of the persons within an institution are 
moral responsibilities. 
“The forms and restraints which make our living together possible  
are created by us, but they in turn help to make us what we are  
and to define what we should be toward one another.”
   Lon Fuller 
 “The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics” 
   Electrical Engineering, October 1955 (917)
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     I will begin with some observations that few, if any, 
will find dubious or objectionable. Institutions can be healthy, or not. 
When they are healthy, they perform well and thus are positioned to 
achieve their purpose or mission. When an institution is healthy, both the 
integrity of those who work within it and the integrity of the institution 
itself enjoy some measure of protection. In an unhealthy institution both 
individual and institutional integrity are at risk. And, of course, the health 
of an institution may be jeopardized when individuals within it conduct 
themselves in ways that exhibit a lack of integrity.     
 The relationship between institutional and individual integrity is 
complex. When attention is directed to the link between the health of insti-
tutions and their integrity and the contribution individual integrity makes 
to both it is apparent that there is considerable complexity here as well. 
 Our lack of deep understanding in this area—a theoretical lack—
contributes to and in fact is fed by a lack of activity on this front in 
practice. The pronounced tendency, in business or government, for 
example, to think that the cause of a scandal is a bad apple rather than a 
bad barrel, confirms the point. It is not that theory encourages the hunt 
for bad apples; rather, what theory contributes to our lack of 
understanding comes mostly by way of its failure to discourage the hunt.  
 In the recent past ethical theory has taken a back seat to applied 
ethics, which takes many of its cues from practice. The heavy reliance on 
case studies in applied ethics is perhaps the best evidence of this trend. 
When cases involve the hunt for bad apples, as they tend to when legal 
questions loom large, the prompts we get from them direct attention to 
individual agency and wrongdoing by individuals. We need to bracket the 
explicit prompts and encourage inquiry that digs beneath the surface. It 
may be helpful to think of the explicit prompts as symptoms that 
challenge us to discover the disease that causes them.   
 That brings us back to the health metaphor with which we began. 
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It seems a reasonable hypothesis that institutional health depends upon 
institutional integrity and institutional integrity depends upon individual 
integrity.1 If that is right, “disease” may be manifest at two levels—at the 
level of institutional or individual integrity.  
 I will begin with the first part of the hypothesis above, that 
institutional integrity is a condition of institutional health. The legal 
theorist Lon Fuller articulated this idea in a less generalized form when 
he spoke of the implicit laws of lawmaking or, more famously, the morality 
internal to law. I will explain and illustrate this idea and, after a bit of a 
detour, I will indicate how it applies to institutions of various sorts, 
including professions such as engineering, architecture, or medicine. 
Then I will turn to the second part of the hypothesis, that there is a 
dependency relation between institutional integrity and individual 
integrity. However, instead of exploring the consequences of lapses of 
integrity by individuals within an organization, I will approach this part of 
the hypothesis in terms of its suggestion that institutional integrity 
nourishes or promotes individual integrity. This suggestion presupposes 
a formative relation between institutions and persons; that in some 
measure our practices dictate both what we should do and what we 
should be. Todd May makes a powerful case for this thesis in his book 
Our Practices, Ourselves, and a recent book on privacy by Anita Allen has 
a similar thrust. I draw on their work to cash out what is little more than a 
suggestion in Fuller’s legal philosophy. I do this with an eye to achieving 
some clarity about what’s at stake if, as was suggested earlier, “disease” 
can manifest itself at the level of institutional integrity as well as individual 
integrity. And that, in turn, adds to the strength of the case for saying, 
with Fuller, that the principles internal to an enterprise constitute a 
morality and the responsibilities of the persons within an institution are 
moral responsibilities.2 
 1 One might be tempted to frame the hypothesis another way: institutional 
integrity is a necessary condition of institutional health and the integrity of 
agents within an institution is a necessary condition of institutional 
integrity. This formulation is, however, unsatisfactory because, among 
other things, a lack of integrity on the part of an agent within an institution 
may, but will not necessarily, undermine the integrity of the institution.
 2  Fuller’s claim met with great resistance as well as derision. In part this was 
the result of his association with secular natural law theory, which invited
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Built Environments for Purposive Human Interaction
 Institutions or organizations are environments for purposive 
human interaction. They are, of course, built environments; they are not 
found in nature. They are human creations. In this respect, they are like 
the built environment we occupy at this moment—a building on the 
campus of the Rochester Institute of Technology, or the one I slept in last 
night, the hotel here on the edge of campus. Sometimes institutions are 
consciously created; sometimes they arise in the manner of customary law, 
which we’ll discuss, albeit briefly, in a later section of this paper. 
 Let us think for a moment about institutions of the first sort,  
that is, those that are consciously created. Examples are not far to seek.  
A think tank such as the Brookings Institution was consciously created;  
so too, the Rochester Institute of Technology, the Republican Party,  
the Catholic Church, the NCAA, Auschwitz, and the United States of 
America. In each case what was instituted, that is, created or set up, came 
into existence—indeed, we can specify the date— and, with one exception 
in the list I provided, still exists, though each has changed somewhat over 
time. Each of these institutions has (or had) a purpose (or set of related 
   if it did not guarantee misunderstanding of his central claim. For instance, 
H.L.A. Hart dismissed Fuller’s claim that the principles internal to the 
lawmaking enterprise constitute a morality saying that Fuller’s morality 
designation rests on and is likely to perpetuate a “confusion of principles 
guiding any form of purposive activity with morality.” As if the principles 
internal to the carpenter’s craft, or worse, the role of a concentration camp 
commandant, constitute a morality.  H.L.A. Hart, review of The Morality 
of Law, by Lon L. Fuller, Harvard Law Review 78 (1965): 1285-87. I 
cannot mount a defense of Fuller’s idea here. I have done so elsewhere, 
however.  See, Daniel E. Wueste, “Fuller’s Processual Philosophy of Law,” 
review of Lon L. Fuller, by Robert S. Summers, Cornell Law Review 71 
(1986): 1214-1217; Wueste, “Morality and the Legal Enterprise—A Reply 
to Professor Summers,” ibid., 1252-1263 (discussing Hart’s criticism, 
Summers’s interpretation of Fuller’s claim, and the question whether—as I 
argue, contra Hart and Summers—the principles Fuller identified as the 
internal morality of law constitute a role morality). The basic issue arises 
outside of jurisprudence. For example, it looms large in my critique of 
David Luban’s position respecting what he calls “institutional excuses.” 
See my “Role Moralities and the Problem of Conflicting Obligations,” in 
Professional Ethics and Social Responsibility, ed. Daniel E. Wueste 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994.)
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purposes) and each is (or was) an arena for human interaction in pursuit 
of that purpose. In the case of the institution that ceased, what is most 
remarkable is the gross iniquity of its purpose. While the evil character  
of its purpose did not guarantee its demise, it did guarantee human 
misery and debasement.  
 Some purposes that we choose to pursue require a special kind 
of place, a space that has the things that we need to accomplish our aims. 
For example, on many college campuses you will find a large space used 
only occasionally, for example, on select Saturday afternoons or evenings 
in the fall, as is the case at Clemson University. The space was created— 
it is a built environment—for a complex set of human interactions 
involving a rather large number of people. At Clemson this space is  
called Death Valley (its official name is Frank Howard Memorial Field) 
and what goes on there is a truly complex set of human interactions 
focused on and including the activities of specially outfitted young men 
who kick, carry and throw an oddly shaped ball for a specified period of 
time to, among other things, engage and gratify roughly 85,000 spectators 
seated in the stands.
 Clemson’s Memorial Stadium is a straightforward example of a 
built environment. It was built using bricks and mortar, girders and glass, 
i.e., familiar, tangible, materials.  It was built for a purpose and purposive 
activities take place within it. Some of these purposive activities take place 
on the field; some take place in the stands and boxes. In some cases, it is 
apparent that the environment was designed to accommodate the activity. 
In other cases, it just happens that the environment is suitable for the 
pursuit of the purpose. In such a case one takes advantage of what is there 
to accomplish something the architect did not have in mind and for 
which no specific provision was made. One good example is when a man 
proposes marriage by arranging to have his proposal appear on the 
scoreboard screen at halftime. In our time one can easily imagine another 
example, on the dark side to be sure, in which a terrorist hacks into the 
computer controlled scoreboard screen and announces that there is a 
bomb in the stadium knowing that, although there is no bomb, his 
purpose will be served, since all will be terrorized and many may indeed 
perish in the panic.
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 I want to draw your attention to three things that I have said 
about this environment, built of bricks and mortar, girders and glass, that 
are true of institutions or organizations qua environments for purposive 
interaction.  
• The environment was built for a purpose and purposive activities 
take place within in it.
• The environment was specifically designed for some of these 
activities.
• Some activities that take place in this built environment were not 
foreseen or planned for by its architect; in other words, although 
the participants in these activities find what they need for their 
purpose in this environment, this is, for them, a happy coinci-
dence. The consequences in such cases are not necessarily happy 
ones, however. The environment and much else may be damaged.  
 You may recall some of my examples of consciously created 
institutions. I mentioned the Rochester Institute of Technology, the 
Republican Party, the Catholic Church, the NCAA, Auschwitz, and the 
United States of America. To be sure, structures made of bricks and 
mortar are associated with these institutions; however, what we have in 
mind when we speak of them as institutions is certainly something more, 
something other than buildings such as the White House or St. Peters in 
Rome. One way of cashing this out is to say that the institutions are 
housed in such structures. This is not terribly precise, however, since, 
among other things, the activities of an institution such as the federal 
government, the Catholic Church or the NCAA are not confined to a 
specific building or, indeed, any building at all. With this observation, 
which is surely a commonplace rather than a discovery, we are in a 
position to grasp the sense in which an institution is a special sort of 
environment built for human interaction.  
 As we have seen, some purposes that we choose to pursue 
require a special kind of place, a space where the conditions for the 
realization of our aims are met. In the case we have been considering—
football in Death Valley—the conditions are satisfied by physical 
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structures. Let us consider another case where the conditions for the 
realization of our purposes neither are nor can be satisfied in this way.
Institutions, Normative Structures and Purposes
 Imagine a group of shipwrecked men, not sailors whose relations 
would be organized by the hierarchy that governed them on board ship,  
but civilians. Suppose, as seems reasonable, that disputes arise among  
them and that they want to resolve them peacefully. There are, in fact, 
several ways to settle disputes peacefully. Tossing dice and flipping a coin, 
for example, are means for dispute resolution. However, not all disputes  
can be resolved by such means. For instance, it seems clear that flipping a 
coin is an inappropriate way to settle a dispute that involves conflicting 
claims of right or an accusation of guilt. A genuine claim of right is a 
demand that is supported by a principle, and an accusation of guilt 
presupposes a standard in terms of which conduct constitutes delict.  
So, for example, with conflicting claims of right there is a quite reasonable 
and settled expectation that resolving the dispute will require 
consideration of the relevant principles.
 Suppose that the dispute that creates the challenge for our 
shipwrecked men involves competing rights claims. One of the men has a 
mirror. He (that is, the owner) claims that since it is his property, it is he 
and he alone who should use the mirror. He agrees, we may suppose, that 
the mirror should be used for signaling, but he claims that he should do 
the signaling. The other party to the dispute, a young Navy veteran who 
served in the signal corps, claims that he should do the signaling because 
he is best qualified to do it. One disputant has a claim of right based on a 
principle respecting ownership; the other has a claim of right based on a 
principle that asserts that custody and use of such items should be based 
on one’s ability to use them in beneficial ways. Certainly, this dispute is 
less amenable to resolution by chance (flipping a coin, for example) than 
a dispute over who has the first watch. While we don’t need a judge in the 
latter case—a coin will do quite nicely—a judge appears to be precisely 
what we need in the case of the dispute over the mirror.3 Here, then, the 
 3 With this example I am following Fuller, who uses a hypothetical involving 
shipwrecked sailors in “Reason and Fiat in Case Law,” 59 Harvard Law 
Review 376 (1946) to get at the elements of the judicial process. 
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purpose the men have set for themselves, namely, peaceful resolution of a 
dispute involving conflicting rights claims, determines the means of its 
realization. For the shipwrecked men, the “space” where the conditions 
for the realization of their purpose are met is normative space; their aim 
will be met within a normative structure, in particular, it will be met 
within the normatively governed practice or institution of adjudication. 
 The adjudicative structure is normative both in its product—
authoritative resolution of disputes—and its process. The link between 
pro-cess and product here is constitutive; the normativity (validity/
authority) of the product is the upshot of the satisfaction of normative 
conditions within the process/practice that are specified by principles 
internal to the enter-prise itself. This idea, that there are principles 
internal to an enterprise that, in fact, make that enterprise possible, in the 
sense of creating the capacity to achieve its purpose, is the idea that Lon 
Fuller struggled to articulate in his books The Morality of Law and The 
Anatomy of Law. In the first case, he spoke of law’s internal morality; in 
the second, perhaps because such talk turned out to be an obstacle to 
understanding (as well as a target of sustained criticism), he spoke instead 
of the implicit laws of lawmaking.  
 I will return to Fuller in a moment. First, however, I want to 
clarify the basic idea that is now on the table by continuing with the 
hypothetical case of the shipwrecked men. Earlier we identified two 
methods of dispute resolution, tossing a coin and adjudication. Both are 
dual aspect normative structures. That is, each is a normatively governed 
practice that creates a product that has a normative function, for example, 
an authoritative decision respecting liability for negligence. One is more 
complex than the other, of course. Yet, the crucial point emerges from the 
same inquiry: what explains the sense of rightness that attaches to the 
products of these practices?  
 If the dispute were resolved by flipping a coin, the only reason that 
could be offered for one party’s being the rightful user of the mirror is the 
pre-toss agreement to abide by the result of the coin toss. The situation 
would be importantly different if the dispute were resolved by adjudicative 
means. For in that case, a reason beyond the agreement to abide by the 
decision of the judge (the upshot of an adjudicative process) could be given. 
Daniel E. Wueste 1 6
That such a reason is forthcoming is a settled expectation within the 
practice of adjudication. In fact, this expectation is inextricably bound up 
with the practice of adjudication. Moreover, this expectation, qua 
normative condition, is the key element in an explanation of the sense of 
rightness that attaches to the judge’s decision, in particular, it explains the 
fact that this sense of rightness seems to be richer and firmer than the 
sense of rightness that attaches to the “decision” made by flipping a coin.  
 In both cases there are conditions that must be satisfied if a sense 
of rightness is going to attach to the decision. For example, in the first 
case, the coin must be a fair coin, and the number of times the coin will 
be tossed must be established before the coin is tossed (is it two out of 
three, or will the coin be tossed only once?). What of the second case?  
Well, here too we find conditions respecting the decision maker qua 
decision maker and conditions with respect to the operation of the 
decision-making process. For instance, the judge must not have been 
bribed or be hopelessly prejudiced; opportunities must be provided for 
the parties to present and defend the principles that support their 
competing rights claims; the judge has to attend to the arguments she 
hears in making her judgment.
Conditions for Decision-maker
Coin toss: The coin must be a fair coin.
Adjudication: The judge has not been bribed and is not 
hopelessly prejudiced.
Conditions for the Operation of the Decision-making Process 
Coin toss: The number of times the coin will be tossed has to be 
settled before the coin is tossed.
Adjudication: Opportunities must be provided for the parties to 
present arguments in which, for example, they articulate and 
defend the principles that support the competing claims of right; 
the judge must attend to these arguments.
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 The complexity of adjudication that we noted earlier is apparent 
here; it is explained in large part by the fact that the role of decision 
maker within this process is assumed by a conscious being that has 
interests and can willfully comply or refuse to comply with the processual 
constraints of that role. One consequence of this is that in practice it is 
easier to distinguish the two sorts of conditions in the coin toss case than 
with adjudication.
 These practices are normative both in their products (decisions 
that resolve disputes) and their processes. The normativity (validity) of 
their products is the upshot of the satisfaction of normative conditions 
specified by governing principles internal to the enterprise itself. As noted 
earlier, this idea, that there are principles internal to an enterprise that, in 
fact, make that enterprise possible, in the sense of creating the capacity to 
achieve its purpose, is central to Lon Fuller’s jurisprudence. It is time to 
make good on the promise I made to return to Fuller. 
Lon Fuller’s Eunomical Jurisprudence
 The most rewarding reading of Fuller begins with an 
appreciation of the eunomical orientation of his jurisprudence. As Ken 
Winston explains in his Introduction to The Principles of Social Order, a 
collection of Fuller’s essays and addresses that he edited, Fuller coined 
the term “eunomics” in 1954 in a review of Edwin Patterson’s book 
Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law. Fuller uses the term eunomics, 
which he defined as “the science, theory, or study of good and workable 
social arrangements,”4 in inviting others to join in the project of 
discovering and studying the principles contained in the forms or 
processes of social order by which human interaction is organized and 
facilitated, for example, legislation, adjudication and contract. Fuller 
began working on this project as early as 1949 in chapter 6 of The 
Problems of Jurisprudence. In fact, as Winston points out, “Fuller’s 
principal concern is…the discovery of natural laws of social order, that is, 
the compulsions and opportunities necessarily contained in particular 
 4 Lon Fuller, “American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century,” 6 Journal of 
Legal Education 457 (1954) 477.
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domains of objective social reality, in certain ways of organizing men’s 
relations with one another.”5 Winston’s point squares with Fuller’s 
description of his project as a sort of “social architecture”6 focusing on 
problems of institutional design. Here is Fuller, writing about codes of 
ethics in the journal Electrical Engineering:  
We must ask of [social institutions] what purposes they serve in 
society and then reason out what restraints must be observed if 
those purposes are to be achieved. When a creative responsibility 
toward social institutions is assumed, we are no more free to 
follow our whims and impulses of the moment than is an 
electrical engineer who undertakes to design a circuit for a 
specified purpose.7 
Fuller is best known, perhaps, for his claim that law has its own internal 
morality. The idea emerges in a story he tells about a hapless King Rex 
who fails as a lawmaker in eight distinguishable ways. The lesson we learn, 
according to Fuller, is that lawmakers must comply with eight principles 
internal to the legal enterprise lest they fail to make law. Laws must be 1) 
general, 2) promulgated, 3) typically prospective, not retroactive, 4) 
clear—that is, readily intelligible.  Laws must also be such that the acts 
they require are 5) neither incompatible nor 6) impossible to perform. 
Moreover, 7) laws must not be changed too frequently, and finally, 8) there 
must be a congruence between the rules as declared and the rules as 
administered. As Fuller has it, these eight principles constitute the 
morality that “makes law possible.” In other words, what we have here 
answers the question of how what emerges from the legislative process 
can make behaviors normatively non-optional, in a word, obligatory.
 5 Kenneth I. Winston, “Introduction,” The Principles of Social Order, ed. 
Kenneth I. Winston (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1981) (hereafter 
PSO) 12.
 6 Lon Fuller, “Means and Ends,” PSO 50-52.
 7 Lon Fuller,  “The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics,” 74 Electrical 
Engineering 916 (1955) 917.
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 I will let Fuller speak for himself:
Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man 
can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not 
exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only 
after he had acted, or was unintelligible, or was contradicted by 
another rule of the same system, or commanded the impossible, 
or changed every minute. It may not be impossible for a man to 
obey a rule that is disregarded by those charged with its 
administration, but at some point obedience becomes futile—as 
futile, in fact, as casting a vote that will never be counted. As the 
sociologist Simmel has observed, there is a kind of reciprocity 
between government and the citizen with respect to the 
observance of rules.8 
 The “principle of reciprocity” is key in Fuller’s account of law’s 
capacity to obligate. Indeed, as Fuller has it, “the notion of reciprocity [is] 
implicit in the very notion of duty—at least in the case of every duty that 
runs toward society or toward another responsible human being.”9 Thus, 
a complete rupture of the “bond of reciprocity” between government and 
citizen leaves nothing “on which to ground the citizen’s duty to observe 
the rules.”10 There is nothing mysterious here, no “brooding omni-
presence in the sky,” just a principle that “has roots…in our professions 
[and] in our practices”11 and is “visible, as it were, in varying degrees. At 
times it is obvious to those affected by it; at others it traces a more subtle 
and obscure course through the institutions and practices of society.”12  
In any case, as Fuller has it, although the principle is “given” and is in 
that sense natural, “we do not know it instinctively.” We “discern and 
understand” it by using “our minds and our powers of observation.”13    
 8 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law revised edition (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1969) (hereafter MOL) 39.
 9 Fuller, MOL 21.
 10 Fuller, MOL 39-40.
 11 Fuller, MOL 21.
 12 Fuller, MOL 22.
 13 Fuller, “The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics,” 74 Electrical Engineering 916 
(1955) 916.
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 Reciprocity is central to Fuller’s description of customary law 
which, he says, “[consists] of the reciprocal expectations that arise out of 
human interaction.”14 This is important for several reasons, but I mention 
it now because in fleshing this out Fuller makes a key point, namely, that 
in addition to prescribing or proscribing certain acts, customary law also 
specifies roles and functions and holds those responsible for discharging 
them to account. If that is right, and I for one think that it is, stable 
interactional expectations are a source of roles and functions as well as 
certain prescriptions or proscriptions; as Fuller puts it, they create both 
“a vocabulary of deeds and a basic grammar.”15
 Consider the practice of casting ballots, an election. This 
practice rests on an assumption, a stable expectation about the activity, 
namely, that a vote cast for candidate A will be counted as a vote for 
candidate A. “This is true,” Fuller explains, “even though the possibility 
that my ballot will be tossed in the wastebasket, or counted for the wrong 
man, may never enter my mind as an object of conscious attention.”16 The 
expectation that votes cast will be faithfully counted is intrinsic to the 
practice of voting or elections; if this expectation is thwarted, “the 
participation of the voter [would lose] its meaning altogether”17 and the 
institution would “[cease] to function in any significant sense at all.”18 
 The Fullerian idea is that human beings build environments for 
purposive interaction, for example, selecting representatives (elections), 
resolving conflicting rights claims (adjudication), or “subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules”19 (legislation). The environments 
they build are spaces where the conditions for the realization of their 
purposes are met. Fuller focused attention on what I called normative 
space where human aims are achieved within a normative structure, that 
is, within a normatively governed practice or institution. According to 
Fuller, each of these institutions has an internal morality, which consists of 
principles that articulate the stable interactional expectations of those who 
 14 Fuller, “The Role of Contract in the Ordering Processes of Society 
Generally,” PSO 176.
 15 Fuller, “Human Interaction and the Law,” PSO 243f.
 16 Fuller, MOL 217.
 17 Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” PSO 92.
 18 Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” PSO 91.
 19 Fuller, MOL 74.
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(inter)act within it. Making these expectations explicit can be difficult,  
however. While they direct and inform our behavior toward others as well 
as our interpretations of their behavior toward us, in general we are not 
conscious of them. As Fuller says, in this respect they are like “rules of 
grammar that we observe in practice without having occasion to articulate 
them until they have been conspicuously violated.”20 Thus, in his work he 
makes extensive use of allegory, telling stories  about shipwrecked men on 
a desert island in “Reason and Fiat in  Case Law,” trapped speluncers in 
“The Case of the Speluncean  Explorers,” and the  hapless King Rex in 
The Morality of Law, where, as we have seen, he reveals the morality 
internal to “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance 
of rules,” i.e., legislation. The analogy to grammar is easy to see in the last 
case, for in the story, as we noted earlier, the principles of the lawmaking 
enterprise emerge as Rex fails to make law.  In each case, his failure is the 
upshot of a violation of a principle internal to the enterprise. Fuller’s 
lesson can be stated simply: institutions such as legislation or elections 
“have an integrity of their own which must be respected if they are to be 
effective at all.”21 Rex’s failures to respect the integrity of the legislative 
enterprise impaired the health of the institution and that, in turn, 
rendered it incapable of achieving its purpose.
Webs of Accountability Within Our Practices   
 In his book, Our Practices, Ourselves, Todd May focuses 
attention on the question of who we are. As he has it, this question is 
“about each of us individually and about us in our being together.” 
Continuing, he explains that the question is “about we as in who each of 
us is, and who we are in our various groupings: who you are and who I 
am and who each of these other folks we share the planet with is.” As you 
might have surmised from the title of his book, his answer is roughly “we 
are our practices.”22
 20 Fuller,  “Human Interaction and the Law,” PSO 218, 221.
 21 Fuller, “The Role of Contract in the Ordering Processes of Society 
Generally,” PSO 180.
 22 Todd May, Our Practices, Our Selves, or What it Means to be Human 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2001). (hereafter OPO) 2.
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 As May uses the term ‘practice’ it refers to “a regularity (or 
regularities) of behavior” that is ordinarily “goal-directed.” A third 
characteristic rounds out his notion of practices: practices are “socially 
and normatively governed.”23 Practices are social in the sense that they 
involve normatively governed positions, i.e., roles that can be occupied by 
a number of persons. The roles are defined by norms (not all of which 
can be formulated as rules) that, among other things, delineate stable 
interactional expectations. An example may be helpful. Baseball is a 
practice in this sense. There are regularities of behavior here that have an 
aim; the regularities of behavior are socially and normatively governed. 
The players have roles that interlock and complement each other and that 
can be cashed out largely in terms of stable interactional expectations. 
The idea is straightforward. One sees readily, for example, that friendship 
and familial life also constitute practices in this sense. This idea of a 
practice is a powerful device for making headway in answering the 
question of who we are.  
 What May calls practices reside, so to speak, “at the intersection 
of the individual and the social.”24 With this notion of practices May 
abandons two ideas that have dominated social and political thinking: on 
the one hand, he walks away from the idea of an individual as solitary, 
self-enclosed, distinct and severable from the social setting in which we 
find her, and on the other hand, he walks away from the idea that an 
individual, a self, is the product of vast social forces—the nation, 
capitalism, society, patriarchy. We are, then, positioned to jettison the idea 
that wisdom and justice in matters social and political begins with the 
distinction between public and private.
 In a recent book, Why Privacy Isn’t Everything, Anita Allen 
directs attention to and provides a very helpful name for the mechanisms 
May has in mind when he says that practices are governed socially and 
normatively. She calls them “webs of accountability,” and very much like 
May she holds that “we live lives enmeshed in” them.25 Moreover, again 
like May, as Allen has it, webs of accountability are ubiquitous, subject to 
 23 May, OPO 8.
 24 May, OPO 12.
 25 Anita Allen, Why Privacy Isn’t Everything (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2003)  (hereafter WPIE) 2, 197-99.
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change, and powerful influences on who we are. This name is, as I said, 
very helpful. It is certainly useful shorthand for a rich, powerful and rather 
Fullerian idea that comprises “actual and felt imperatives, including 
obligations, duties and responsibilities.”26
 Think again of baseball. The players have interlocking and 
complementary roles and they are accountable to one another (and others 
such as fans) in the sense that a reckoning may be required.27 Each may 
be required to explain or justify an action—throwing the ball to first 
instead of trying for a double-play, for instance—or to provide information, 
to act reliably, or do their reckoning through the mechanism of sanctions 
that are meted out and endured. Their accountability is a matter of 
degree; its measure depends on the degree to which, for example, 
explaining or justifying one’s actions to others is (or is felt to be) non-
optional, that is, obligatory. There is a web of accountability here. It is an 
intrinsic element of the practice.
 What I want to flag with this return to the baseball example is 
that webs of accountability are internal to practices; they are, as it were, 
structural elements. Actually, it would be more accurate to say that they 
are not only structural but structuring elements. This last is a point I 
want to explore further. 
 Very often, perhaps more often than not, talk of accountability, 
like talk of responsibility, brings to mind wrongs for which one is held to 
account in the sense of being liable to unwelcome treatment at the hands 
of another, for instance punishment. Further, there is a tendency to think 
that what occasions such accountability is a transgression, a trespass, the 
performance of an act that violates a rule. In the main, the rule that has 
been violated in such cases is a rule that forbids action. The rule was 
supposed to check, hold back, or prevent folks from taking a course of 
action. It said “No”; the agent ignored the voice of power and did it 
anyway. Of course, some rules don’t restrain us from acting; rather, they 
constrain us to act. This dyad of doing is a province of power; for 
 26 Allen, WPIE 17.
 27 Here I follow Allen, for whom accountability is a matter of reckoning with 
others, which we do by explaining and justifying our actions to others, by 
providing information, by acting reliably, and through the mechanism of 
sanctions that are meted out and endured.
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example, one way in which governmental power over people manifests 
itself is in its demands that we do or not do certain things. The realm of 
power extends further, however. In addition to being able to get people to 
do or not do something, as May observes, “to have power over people is 
to be able to get them either to be or not be something.” May goes on, 
Although traditional political philosophers have focused their 
energies on the not-doing and not-being part, we all recognize 
that what is at stake in power are doings and beings as well as 
not-doings and not-beings.28
The neglect of doings and beings is explained by the fact that social and 
political philosophy direct attention to forces such as society or 
government that have a wide or general scope and limit liberty (largely, 
though not exclusively) by in effect saying no. Sometimes these forces say 
no with an eye to preventing harm, as Mill argued they may, or to prevent 
sin, or offense, or indeed, for the good of the people whose liberty will be 
limited, all of which Mill argued they may not do. The theories of 
traditional social and political philosophy emerge from inquiries about 
what makes a society or government just. The philosopher is looking for 
the principle (or principles) that justifies limiting liberty or, if you will, 
exercising the power of no. In the liberal tradition this leads to a 
distinction between public and private and a two-part claim about these 
large forces, namely (1) that they have no right to say no to conduct that 
is private and (2) their power to say no is legitimately exercised only 
under certain circumstances, for example, to prevent harm to others. 
 May directs attention elsewhere, to the “question of what makes 
us do and be certain things.” He argues against the assumption that power 
is a matter of restraint; he locates “the power that does not simply restrain 
us but also creates us…at the level of practices.” He is working at a differ-
ent level, which he calls “local,”29 where power not only restrains people 
from acting, by saying no, but also constrains them to do or be something. 
I believe that what May has in mind here is a creative power that works by 
 28 May, OPO 176. Emphasis added.
 29 May, OPO 176.
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channeling. I find this metaphor apt because, as May has it, practices make 
us who we are in the sense that “what we do, what we believe, and what 
we feel [are] created and sustained” by the practices we engage in.30
 Our practices tell us what to do and what to be; they enumerate 
our responsibilities and articulate aspirations. I will not press the baseball 
example any further, instead I invite you to think of the practice of a 
profession—lawyering, or medicine, engineering, or the professorate, for 
example. Membership in any of these professions entails responsibilities 
and aspirations. Indeed, the linkage between who one is and one’s 
profession can scarcely be denied. After all, prominent among the 
questions one asks in choosing a profession is whether that is what one 
wants to be. Professional practices have the power to form selves and 
sustain them once created. 
 I believe that a large part of this formative and sustaining power 
resides in what Anita Allen calls webs of accountability. Consider for a 
moment the web of accountability within a professional practice, that is, a 
professional ethic. Such a web of accountability constitutes a role morality 
the norms of which are either “created, applied and enforced by some 
organization,” or “generally accepted, followed and sanctioned informally 
within some community.”31 These norms are standards for action and 
reaction: they apply to a role agent who is deciding what action to take; 
they also apply to the reactions of others (within and outside of a 
profession) who observe or otherwise become aware of deviation from (or 
conformity with) them. What we have here is a web of accountability 
internal to a practice. Recalling the point made earlier about what’s at stake 
in the choice of a profession—is that what I want to be? —it should be clear 
that doings and not-doings, beings and not-beings are within its scope.
 So, again, I think a large part of the power of practices to form 
and sustain selves—to make us who we are—is found in what Allen calls 
webs of accountability. It is clear that she is aware of this facet of 
accountability, for she notes how it “chills, deters, punishes, prompts, 
pressures, and exposes” and yet “protects, dignifies, and advantages.”32 
 30 May, OPO 175.
 31 Carl Wellman, A Theory of Rights, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1985) 118. 
 32 Allen, WPIE 195.
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She observes that official accountability to the state and unofficial 
accountabilities constrain in similar ways and she recognizes that 
accountability is a “device of group identity and solidarity” within 
families and religious groups, for example.33 Moreover, it is clear that she 
sees the creative power of webs of accountability within practices at what 
May would call the local level. As it happens, in the place where this 
recognition is clearest, she is talking about the “dark side” of webs of 
accountability. Noting that they may have positive effects, her emphasis 
falls on the fact that  “suffocating, harsh, nongovernmental accountability 
can make a person wretched.”34
 To my mind the singular importance of webs of accountability 
emerges at this juncture with an awareness of their creative and sustaining 
power. It is important to note that from the practice perspective we won’t 
always be able to identify a person or institution that is using the practice 
to mold us or make us what we are. The reason for this is that practices 
do not require agency of either sort. In this respect, webs of accountability 
map onto a distinction familiar in the law; what I have in mind is the 
distinction between law “by position,” for example, positive law created 
by a legislature, and customary law, which, as Fuller suggests, is an 
interactional phenomenon. The basic idea was articulated earlier when 
we spoke of institutions as built environments for purposive human 
interaction and noted that some of them are consciously created while 
others arise in the manner of customary law.
Revisiting Fuller: Institutional and Individual Integrity 
 Customary law arises out of interaction and serves to order and 
facilitate it. Fuller describes it in general terms as “reciprocal expectations 
that arise out of human interaction.”35 As we develop ways of interacting 
that allow us to achieve mutual or complementary aims these forms of 
interaction become regularized. Although they are not consciously 
created, these forms of interaction are human artifacts; they are built 
environments for purposive human interaction. Turning our conscious 
 33 Allen, WPIE 198-99.
 34 Allen, WPIE 199.
 35 Fuller, “The Role of Contract in the Ordering Processes of Society 
Generally,” PSO 176.
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attention to them we can discern and articulate the stable interactional 
expectations comprised by them, that is to say, we can articulate what 
Fuller calls their internal principles or the customary law of a form of 
interaction.
 As we have seen, on Fuller’s view customary law is not limited to 
the prescription or proscription of certain acts. It also designates roles and 
functions and, when the occasion arises, it “holds those discharging those 
roles and functions to an accounting for their performances.” It consti-
tutes both “a vocabulary of deeds and a basic grammar.”36 What Fuller 
has in mind “primarily [are] the tacit commitments that develop out of 
interaction”37 and that, as it happens, is also what he has in mind when 
speaks of the implicit laws of lawmaking, a.k.a. the morality internal to law. 
So, we have returned to the internal morality idea that we visited earlier in 
talking about institutional integrity, though now, having taken seriously 
May’s points about practices, we recognize a formative relation between 
institutions and persons in which “what we do, what we believe, and what 
we feel [are] created and sustained” by the practices we engage in.38 
 Fuller’s point, you will recall, is that there are principles internal 
to an enterprise that underlie its capacity to achieve its purpose. We 
explored this idea in connection with the sense of rightness that attaches to 
the products of adjudication as well as the practice of resolving disputes by 
means of a coin toss. In the case of lawmaking, which has the purpose of 
making some conduct normatively non-optional, Fuller called the 
principles internal to the project the morality of law. In each case, what is at 
stake is the effective realization of an institutional purpose; in order to 
achieve the purpose, one has to comply with the normative constraints 
intrinsic to the enterprise, which is essentially the task of maintaining its 
integrity. Fuller’s hapless King Rex, for example,  failed to do this and for 
that reason he failed to make law.
 36 Fuller, “Human Interaction and the Law,” PSO 243f.
 37 Fuller, MOL 234.
 38 May, OPO 175. Earlier, in discussing institutions as environments for 
purposive human interaction, we noted that their architects did not foresee 
some of the things that take place within such built environments. I suspect 
that more often than not, the forming and sustaining of selves is one of those 
unforeseen activities; all the more when the institution is not consciously 
built but arises in the manner of customary law. 
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 As Fuller hinted and May argues eloquently, in some measure 
our practices dictate both what we should do and what we should be; 
they “help to make us what we are.”39 Of course, this formative thrust of 
institutions can be positive or negative; it can work for good or ill. And 
thus it emerges that “disease” may be manifest at two levels—at the level 
of institutional or individual integrity. Bad apples can spoil a barrel and a 
bad barrel can create bad apples. Because this reciprocal relationship is 
creative and because what is being created or built are the forms of our 
living together and ourselves, it is hard to deny Fuller’s claim that the 
principles internal to an institution—a normative structure or normatively 
governed enterprise—constitute a morality, and that the responsibilities of 
the persons within an institution are moral responsibilities. Thus, as I 
suggested at the start, Fuller’s eunomical jurisprudence provides an 
excellent starting place for a serious and sustained conversation about 
institutional integrity.… And we do need to talk….about institutional 
integrity, in particular, we need to talk and then to act in ways that are 
informed by an appreciation of the capacity of healthy institutions to 
nourish or promote individual integrity.  
 39 Fuller, “The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics,” 74 Electrical Engineering 916 
(1955) 917.
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